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Abstract  
This paper demonstrates that settlement-date accounting for equity share options can be seen as an 
accounting method which implements a shareholder focused residually rewarded partners’ equity 
view. This equity view represents a simple, natural extension of the shareholder proprietary view. It 
implicates an equity and income sharing model for accounting which is characterized by 
specification of both shareholders’ and non-shareholders’ parts of total equity and income.  When 
using this equity and income sharing model, the remeasurements of equity share option obligations 
made by settlement-date accounting are fully conceptually valid. They represent measurements of 
one partner group’s share of total equity with effect for another group’s share of total equity and 
income: the shareholders’ part. Partially, this equity and income sharing model is already the basis 
for existing accounting standards.  
It is shown that an intriguing implication of the equity and income sharing model is the fact that 
treasury shares can hedge present shareholders’ share price risk from the obligation to holders of 
equity share options. A special hedge accounting construct is needed to account for this hedge 
effect, and the construct of this model is shown. Numerical simulations are used to illustrate the 
long run expense effects for shareholders from equity share options by settlement-date accounting 
both when the expense effects are unhedged and when they are hedged with treasury share holdings. 
The results demonstrate that the expenses resulting from settlement-date accounting for equity share 
option awards are significantly higher on average than the expenses resulting from grant-date 
accounting. And they show that the cost of equity, the share price volatility and the lifetime of the 
equity share options are important determinants for the size of the differences in total expenses, 
which in a long run perspective is to be expected from the use of these two alternative accounting 
models for equity share options. The simulation results demonstrate that hedging with treasury 
share holdings is very effective to stabilize expenses resulting from options granted to employees.     
 
Introduction 
Shortly stated, settlement-date accounting has the effect that the cumulative expense resulting from 
an equity share option, ESO, is the intrinsic value of the ESO at settlement. In contrast, grant-date 
accounting for ESOs, which is actually the method prescribed by IASB and proposed by FASB, has 
the effect that the cumulative ESO expense charged to income over the life of the ESO is the fair 
value of the option at grant date, net of forfeitures. 
Christensen and Feltham (2003)
1 demonstrate that the grant-date accounting method for ESOs 
results in a mixed-equity measure and dirty surplus accounting from present shareholders’ point of 
view, and they also show that super-clean surplus accounting (for present shareholders) will only 
result from use of settlement-date accounting for ESOs.  
Other researchers have argued also in favour of settlement-date accounting based on the super-clean 
income consideration; see Kaplan and Palepu (2003) and Kirschenheiter et al. (2004). 
Kirschenheiter et al. compare the relative qualities of grant-date accounting and settlement-date 
accounting and find that grant-date accounting does not meet some basic logical quality criteria for 
equity and income, while these criteria are met by settlement-date accounting. Basically the quality 
criteria used in their study are implications of the clean income criterion. 
For other accounting researchers settlement-date accounting for employee share options represents 
a dilemma, though. Hirst et al. (2005) present the comments of the members of the Financial 
Accounting Committee of the American Accounting Association to the FASB March 2004 
Exposure Draft, “Share-Based Payment: An Amendment of FASB Statement No. 123 and No. 95”, 
                                                 
1 pp. 296-303.  and these comments clearly show that the committee is convinced of the clean surplus quality of 
settlement-date accounting. Nevertheless the committee states that it cannot “recommend 
settlement-date accounting for ESO awards classified as equity instruments because remeasurement 
is conceptually inconsistent with equity classification and classifying such awards as liabilities is 
difficult to defend”. In short, the reasoning is that a) unexercised ESO awards represent equity for a 
company (and not liability as suggested in Kirschenheiter et al. (2004); b) equity cannot be 
remeasured with effect for income; and c) such remeasurements represent a pivotal element in 
settlement-date accounting. 
Presumption b) – equity cannot be remeasured with effect for income – is prevailing and typically 
seen as an inescapable logical implication of basic accounting concepts and logic. 
The first part of this paper will demonstrate, however, that this is not correct and that settlement-
date accounting for ESO awards is in fact fully reconcilable with basic accounting concepts and 
logic if a shareholder focused residually rewarded partners’ equity view is consistently adopted.. In 
this “proprietary” view, the company’s equity includes all capital contributed by all residually 
rewarded company partners, shareholders and option holders, but with a specification of both 
partner groups share of total equity. The shareholder focused residually rewarded partners’ equity 
view represents a natural extension of the shareholders’ proprietary view when special contracts 
give option holders (or other non-shareholders) significant rights to share with present shareholders, 
on uneven terms, the residual benefits generated by a company. It is also shown that some elements 
of this equity view have already been partially adopted by IFRS 2, Share-based Payment. 
An implication of shareholder focused residually rewarded partners’ equity view is that a 
remeasurement of option holders’ part of company equity and income, with effect for shareholders’ 
part of equity and income, represents a logical and necessary element in the financial statements . 
The remeasurement of equity made by settlement-date accounting is such an equity split 
measurement, and it is consequently fully reconcilable with basic accounting concept – it is not a 
logically invalid remeasurement of total company equity with effect for total company income. 
An additional, intriguing implication of this “proprietary” view and the equity and income 
separation model for ESO-accounting is that treasury shares have asset characteristics for existing 
shareholders in relation to their equity sharing arrangement with holders of ESO-rights, although 
treasury shares are not assets for the company. This hedge effect for shareholders from treasury 
shares vis-à-vis holders of ESO rights can be accounted for in an unbiased manner by a special 
hedge accounting construct, which is also described in this paper, and the income effects of such a 
hedge are analysed by numerical simulation. 
A prerequisite for demonstrating these hedge effects is analysing the unhedged income effects from 
ESOs for shareholders (the unhedged “ESO expense”) so these effects will also analysed here by 
use of numerical simulation. Previously, Harter and Harikumar (2002) have used numerical 
simulation to analyse the numerical differences between the sizes of the enumeration expenses 
resulting from grant-date accounting and settlement-date accounting. But the authors do not include 
the effect of market risk, and thus not the effect of cost of equity, for the size of the ESO expense 
resulting from settlement-date accounting; so their simulation results is only valid for at very small 
subset of companies. Here Harter and Harikumar’s method is extended to analyse expense effects 
from ESOs for a broad group of companies in long run perspective by including the market risk 
effect in a numerical simulation of ESOs’ expense effects.   
The analysis here is completely focused on the implications of the residually rewarded partners’ 
equity view and the equity and income separation model for settlement-date accounting. The 
analysis is based on the presumption that for shareholders settlement-date accounting results in the 
most informative reflection of income effects of ESOs in the financial statements and that the 
“only” problem is to reconcile this accounting method with basic accounting concepts. Tax effects 
of ESOs are ignored. Implications of the residually rewarded partners’ equity view for accounting 
for other contractual relationships, which implicate an equity sharing arrangement between 
shareholders and other contract holders, are not specifically dealt with either. 
  2The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the residually rewarded partners’ equity view; 
section 3 presents the implications of this view for financial statement presentations and compares 
these presentation implications with a liability interpretation of ESOs and also with a hybrid 
interpretation of ESO-effects, which is implied by IFRS 2, Share-based Payment; section 4 analyses 
equity remeasurement implications of the shareholder focused residually rewarded partners’ equity 
view; section 5 presents the results of numerical simulation of total enumeration expenses resulting 
from settlement-date accounting; section 6 presents the special hedge accounting construct, which 
can reflect in an unbiased manner the hedge effects of treasury shares for existing stockholders vis-
à-vis ESO holders; section 7 presents the numerical effects of such hedging; section 8 concludes the 
paper.  
   
Residually rewarded partners’ equity view and ESO accounting 
Predominantly both the international financial reporting standards and the US accounting standards 
are based on a shareholder proprietary view. In recent years, however, there has been a tendency to 
prescribe in the accounting standards that capital contributed by non-shareholders is included in 
company equity and there has also been a tendency to widen the concept of “shareholders”. IFRS 2 
prescribes that the value of ESO awards granted is reflected as equity contributed by employees. 
IAS 39 prescribes that the value of call option rights to company shares, which are embedded in 
other financial instruments, is included in company equity. The proposed amendments to IAS 27 
and IFRS 3 (both 2005) prescribe that the minority interest is included as a separate part of 
company equity, and this means that the majority shareholder proprietary view has been replaced by 
a broader shareholder proprietary view (typically in this context referred to as an “entity view”). 
It is argued here that an attractive conceptual explanation for this tendency is that a residually 
rewarded partners’ equity view has replaced a shareholder proprietary view, which implicitly and 
partially has been extended, and that financial statement information would become more useful for 
shareholders if the accounting standard setters had more consistently adopted and implemented a 
residually rewarded partners’ equity view. 
The residually rewarded partners’ equity view implies that company equity and company income 
includes equity and income, respectively, for all the residually rewarded partners in the company, 
i.e. those who have contributed capital in return for contractual residual rights to company values 
and/or company value generation. Residual rights mean rights to receive from the company 
economic benefits, which are not numerically stipulated. If the company’s performance does not 
result in sufficient value generation, the holders of residual rights will not receive much, if anything, 
from the company; if, on the other hand, the company value generation turns out to be high, there is 
no limit on the benefits, which the holders of these residual contractual rights are entitled to receive 
from the company. In the residually rewarded partners’ equity view, the liabilities in the financial 
statements shall correspondingly include only obligations with the characteristic that the company’s 
commitment to deliver payments or services to the claimants does not depend upon the company’s 
financial performance. As in other proprietary views there will in practice exist borderline cases in 
which it will be difficult to decide unambiguously what is the equity element and what the liability 
element, but there problems will hardly be more difficult to solve in the residually rewarded 
partners’ equity view than in other proprietary views. 
The “residual rights” equity view can be seen as a more clearly economically based “proprietary” 
view than other (narrow) proprietary views that have been suggested in the literature because these 
views include in equity only the rights of “owners”, i.e. they are at least to some extent based on 
restrictions that reflect the legal status of the contract holder. And a more pronounced economically 
oriented proprietary view is definitely advantageous, perhaps even necessary, when companies to a 
significant extent acquire services for contracts, which give others than shareholders contractual 
residual rights towards the company. This is especially the case when these rights have other 
economic effects for the contract holders than shares do, and it is uncertain whether the rights will 
have the effect that the contract holders will eventually become shareholders. Particularly this is so 
  3because a transition from a shareholders’ equity view to a residually rewarded partners’ equity view 
does not necessitate that “the baby is thrown out with the bath water” – it is not a problem to 
combine the residually partners’ equity view with the view that the financial statement must specify 
separately the shareholders’ part of total company equity and income.. Such a specification 
requirement is natural and prudent out of the pragmatic consideration that the financial statement 
should primarily accommodate the shareholders’ point of view since the financial statement 
information will typically be of most direct usefulness for shareholders because shareholders have a 
constant need for relevant financial information to support their decisions to hold or sell their shares 
or to buy more shares. 
Therefore, the most obvious choice is to adopt a shareholder focused residually rewarded partners’ 
equity view, in which the shareholders’ part of total equity and total income, respectively, is 
separately presented.  
The two next sections demonstrate that settlement-date accounting is a logical implementation of 
the shareholder focused residually rewarded partners view for ESOs, and also that IFRS 2, which 
prescribes the grant-date accounting model, has in fact partially adopted this equity view. 
First the implications for financial statement presentation of ESO rights are dealt with and next the 
implications for remeasurements of ESO rights.  
 
Presentations of ESO rights and proprietary views 
The implications of an equity sharing accounting model for the presentation of ESO expense effects 
in the financial statement are illustrated and compared here with alternative presentations of ESO 
expense effects in the financial statement.  
It is assumed, tentatively, that it is conceptually valid to remeasure the ESO part of total company 
equity to fair value when a shareholder focused residually rewarded partners’ equity view is 
adopted. We can then focus on the presentation in the financial statements of ESO effects by 
settlement-date accounting and see how the presentations vary logically with the choice of 
proprietary view.    
These differences are presented by an example with ESO-effects, inspired by examples in 
Kirschenheiter et al. (2004), but it is much simpler, because only the financial statement 
presentation effects of the proprietary view are dealt with here. Assume agreement on the following 
points in this example: ESO holders’ rights towards the company had an estimated fair value of 100 
in the closing balance for the previous year. In the closing balance this year these rights have the 
fair value 300, primarily due to a big increase in the company’s share prices during the financial 
year. 
Table 1 illustrates a liability presentation of the ESO effects, which reflects an underlying 
shareholders’ equity view, together with two different presentations of the ESO effects, which both 
reflect an underlying residually rewarded partners’ equity view. The accounting figures used in 
illustration have been set “arbitrarily” except that they reflect the assumption that the company does 
not pay dividends and that the clean income restriction is fulfilled.  
 
[Insert table 1 here, please]  
 
The residually rewarded partners’ equity view results in an equity and income separation 
presentation of the ESO effects, and the most stringent version of that presentation model is the 
“consolidation layout” presentation of the ESO expense effects, which is illustrated in the first two 
columns in table 1. In this layout the equity and income separation effects of ESOs are presented 
just like the equity and income separation effects in consolidated financial statements for a group in 
which there is minority interest and the minority’s part of equity is presented as a separate part of 
consolidated equity. In such financial statements both the majority’s and the minority’s part of 
equity and income are included in company equity and income, but as separately stated parts of 
equity and income.  
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the next two columns in table 1. It will be seen that there are only minor differences between the 
equity and income separation presentation in the consolidation layout and the liability presentation. 
But the differences in presentations are nonetheless relevant because they send different signals on 
the aspect of time for ESO values. The liability presentation can be said to reflect the static aspect 
that the ESO value represents an exogenous input for the financial statement: fair value of ESOs at 
closing date. In contrast, the equity and income sharing presentation more distinctively draws 
attention to the dynamic interrelation between income figures in the financial statements and the 
value of ESO rights. The value of ESO awards will tend to increase and decrease with total 
company income, but unexpected increases (decreases) in total company income will tend to 
amplify corresponding changes in the ESO holders’ part of income, since share prices will often 
tend to increase (decrease) much in such situations due to induced changes in shareholders’ 
“permanent” income expectations, and the share prices will determine the option holders’ “cut” of 
total company income. This dynamic interrelation is relevant for endeavours to predict 
shareholders’ future income, since future shareholder income will not only depend upon predictions 
of total company income, but also on the predictions of what part of future income the option 
holders will get. As indicated in table 1, it is for example “bad luck” for the stockholders in a 
company which has granted ESOs if the stock market makes significant upward revisions of future 
income predictions before the ESO rights are exercised. The equity and income separation 
presentation draws attention to these interaction effects between past and future total income, option 
holders’ part of income and shareholders’ part of income since this presentation clearly signals that 
there is a sharing of the residual rewards from company value generation between two groups who 
do not share these rewards on even terms.  
This dynamic argument for the equity and income sharing interpretation and presentation of ESO 
effects favours the argument that the rights of employees with cash settled share-based enumeration 
contracts should also be presented as residually rewarded rights. This would have the consequence 
that these rights, too, should be included in company equity and their income effects for 
shareholders should be presented by a separation of the part of company income which the holders 
of such rights have earned in the year. And these rights are clearly also residually rewarded rights.   
Table 1 illustrates an additional presentation, the “IFRS 2”-layout, which reflects the financial 
statement layout for ESO accounting prescribed by IFRS 2 “Share-based Payment”, although the 
layout is here adopted for settlement-date accounting instead of grant-date accounting, which is 
actually prescribed by IFRS 2. The “IFRS 2”-layout presentation can be characterised as a hybrid 
between the liability presentation and the equity and income separation presentation. In the income 
statement the effects of ESOs are reflected as enumeration expenses and “net income” is “net 
income for shareholders”. But in the balance sheet “owners’ equity” is total equity for shareholders’ 
and option holders’ without any separation of these two groups’ specific parts of the total equity. So 
this layout can be said to represent a half-hearted acceptance and implementation of the shareholder 
focused residually rewarded partners’ equity view: the capital contributed by ESO holders is seen as 
equity, but this equity is not separately specified, and the shareholders’ part of income is presented 
as total company income. A technical accounting implication of this choice of layout is that the 
ESO expense is brought directly back to company equity when it is deducted in the income 
statement. In the shareholder focused residually rewarded partners’ equity view this chargeback to 
equity reflects the fact that the option holders’ part of equity has been increased by a capital inflow 
of exactly the same size as the reduction in the shareholders’ part of equity. Superficially, however, 
this chargeback might appear to represent a conceptually invalid remeasurement of total equity with 
effect for total income when this presentation layout is used for settlement-date accounting for 
ESOs. 
In the next section the delicate problem of remeasurements of equity with effects for income is 
addressed.  
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As mentioned earlier, remeasurement of equity with effect for income is considered conceptually 
invalid and absurd, without exception. This restrictive view on remeasurements of equity is not 
logically valid in a shareholder focused residually partners’ equity view, though. 
A remeasurement of company equity with effect for company income is certainly logically absurd. 
But it is neither logically invalid nor absurd to measure one residually rewarded groups’ part of total 
company equity and income from values and value changes which are not recognized in the 
financial statements for the company with effect also for another residually rewarded partner 
groups’ part of equity and income. In fact such remeasurements represent a fully logical implication 
of the shareholder focused residually rewarded partners’ equity view: total company equity (and 
consequently also clean company income) is certainly not measured separately, but, by definition, 
follows from the accounting measurements of assets and liabilities. But the separation of the 
shareholders’ part of equity (and thus also their clean income) necessitates a measurement of the 
other residually rewarded partners’ part of total equity and income, which represents a separate 
measurement in the sense that this measurement includes other values than the accounting values of 
the assets and liabilities which are recognized in the financial statements. 
Separate measurement of one part of equity (and income) with effect for another part of equity (and 
income) does not represent a new and revolutionary element in accounting. Recurring 
measurements of the individual owner groups’ part of total company equity and income have 
always been an integrated element in consolidated financial statements with a minority owner 
interest when the minority owners’ part of consolidated net assets is included as a separate part of 
total consolidated equity. In this case the minority’s part of total consolidated equity (and income) is 
found at each balance sheet date by a separate calculation. This separate calculation includes values 
of assets and liabilities (and revenues and expenses) which are not assets and liabilities (revenues 
and expenses) for the group, but only for the partially owned subsidiaries, and it includes also value 
elements that have been eliminated from recognized values of consolidated assets and liabilities. 
The calculation of the minority’s and the majority’s separate parts of equity (and income) includes, 
for example, values of intra-group debt and receivables (and interest thereon) which are debt and 
receivables (and resulting interest expenses) only for the partially owned subsidiaries, and it 
includes also allocations of eliminated group internal profits, which determines the size of the two 
individual owner-groups’ parts of equity and income.  
The calculation of the minority’s and the majority’s parts of total consolidated equity and income is 
thus a “measurement of equity with effect for income” in the financial statements and it is 
fundamentally based on a majority shareholder focused residually rewarded partners’ equity view: 
the determination of one owner group’s part of equity and income determines the equity and income 
“left for” the other owner group, the majority. But since a “plus effect” for the minority’s part of 
equity and income has identical “minus effect” for the majority’s part of equity and income
2, the 
remeasurement of one part of equity is not in conflict with basic accounting logic or concepts; no 
company income is conjured out of company equity, i.e. the total equity of all residually rewarded 
partners in the company.  
In a shareholder focused residually rewarded partners’ equity view a remeasurement at balance 
sheet date of ESO equity rights to their fair value of these rights corresponds, structurally, exactly to 
the measurement of the minority’s equity in consolidated financial statements. In substance the 
measurements will naturally differ due to the differences in the underlying contractual relationships, 
                                                 
2 Except for cases in which there is a sale of a minor part of the parent’s shares in a subsidiary at a higher price than the 
intrinsic value of these shares. In a majority shareholder focused residually rewarded equity view such a sale should 
result in a gain for the majority shareholders, although the gain should clearly not be included in total group income. It 
is a supplementary gain for the majority shareholders generated “directly” by the minority, since the minority, from an 
accounting point of view, acquires a part of equity which is less than the capital that the minority pays into the group via 
the purchase of subsidiary shares. The proposed amendment to IFRS 3 does, however, not allow recognition of such a 
gain in majority income.  
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shareholders. But both measurements are based on “non-accounting values” that reflect the 
contractual equity separation effects for the two residually rewarded partner groups, and in both 
cases the (majority) shareholders are seen as the group of residually rewarded company partners to 
which the financial statements are primarily addressed – the financial statements end up in a 
presentation of their part of company income. 
The reason for the choice of fair values of ESOs to determine the equity and income split between 
shareholders and holders of ESO rights – and thus for the choice of settlement-date accounting – is 
that this choice will result in clean surplus accounting for shareholders (if there is a clean surplus 
accounting at total company level). And the clean surplus accounting quality will ensure several 
useful “technical” qualities of the financial statements for the shareholders.  
The fact that settlement-date accounting for ESOs implies a measurement of option holders’ equity, 
which functionally is closely related to the company’s share prices and highly positively correlated 
with these share prices, should not be a deterrent for use of settlement-date accounting for ESO 
accounting. The use of the share price by the measurement of option holders’ rights does not result 
in a hotchpotch of accounting measurements and share market measurements in the financial 
statements. The accounting measurement of total company equity and income will certainly not be 
influenced by the company’s share price; the share price will influence only the split of total 
company equity of income. 
So it seems valid to conclude that settlement-date accounting is fully compatible with the view that 
ESO rights are seen as a separate part of total company equity. All the elements in settlement-date 
accounting are completely conceptually valid if a residually rewarded partners’ equity view is 
consistently adopted. 
In contrast, grant-date accounting represents an inconsistent adoption of this equity view: ESO 
rights are included in equity, but not as a separate part of total equity, while the income statement 
purports to present shareholders’ separate part of income. Based on the residually rewarded 
partners’ equity view, grant-date accounting is only correct for another type of contract: one which 
gives the employees the right to acquire at “exercise date” shares in the company at current share 
price minus a predetermined discount. With such a contract it is not a problem, at least not a serious 
one, to include the rights of the employees in shareholders’ equity, since the “option” contract 
holders will (except for forfeitures) for certain become future shareholders and the exercise reward 
given to these contract holders will be known with certainty from grant date. The ESO contract is, 
however, very different. The ESO contract holders are “only” potential future shareholders, and in 
the ESO contract period it is unknown whether they will in fact become shareholders and the size of 
the residual reward they will get from existing shareholders is also unknown.      
So there are strong arguments to support that settlement-date accounting is completely conceptually 
valid by a residually rewarded partners’ equity view, which grant-date accounting is not, although 
this method is to some extent based on this equity view, too. 
An additional intriguing implication of this equity view is that treasury shares can hedge existing 
shareholders’ risk from ESO rights. Before this effect can be demonstrated it is necessary to analyse 
the unhedged income effects of ESOs for shareholders. This is done in the next section. 
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Grant-date accounting for ESOs results in an income reduction for shareholders (in short: ESO 
expenses) which is identical to the estimated grant date fair value of the options granted, net of 
forfeitures. If the ESO obligation is not hedged, settlement-date accounting for ESOs will result in 
expenses identical to the intrinsic value of the ESOs when the options are exercised – ESO expenses 
will be trued up and they will reflect the actual gross economic sacrifice of market shareholders 
caused by the grant of ESOs. By construct, grant-date accounting will result in identical ESO 
expenses for companies that have granted ESOs with identical grant date values. In contrast, 
settlement-date accounting will result in different sizes of expenses from such ESOs, since the 
individual ex post share prices vary among companies. The average expense for “all” companies’ 
from a given ESO contract will also vary over time with bull and bear periods in the share market 
when settlement-date accounting is used. These differences between the income effects of grant-
date accounting and settlement-date accounting are obvious. 
It is not obvious, however, how much the total ESO expense resulting from settlement-date 
accounting for an ESO should be expected to vary in the long run. Nor is it obvious how much the 
level of total ESO expense resulting from settlement-date accounting can be expected to differ from 
the level of the total ESO expenses resulting from grant-date accounting for a given ESO contract.  
Therefore, the long run size and volatility of the total ESO expense from settlement-date accounting 
for two ESO contracts are illustrated here by numerical simulation results which are compared with 
the size of total ESO expense resulting from grant-date accounting for these two ESO contracts.  
Here it was decided to illustrate grant date values and the intrinsic values at settlement date for two 
European options with different lifetimes, but both without dividends. The choice of European 
options simplifies calculations since these options expire at a given date, and the assumption about 
no dividends means that the options’ grant date fair values are simply determinable by the Black-
Scholes formula. 
The total ESO expense by settlement-date accounting is the intrinsic value of that ESO on the 
expiration date. Methodologically, the numerical simulations of the intrinsic values are based on 
assumptions which represent a natural extension of the assumptions underlying option price theory, 
since this theory is based on a specific probability distribution of future share values.  
An extension of the assumptions underlying option price theory is needed, though, because Black-
Scholes’ formula for the price of a share call option at a given date is not derived directly from the 
probability distribution of the actual future share prices at that date, but from the probability 
distribution of the future risk corrected share prices, i.e. future share prices reduced by the market’s 
deductions for bearing market risk, cf. Black and Scholes (1973).  So the probability distribution, 
from which the grant date price of the option is derived, cannot be the only basis for the numerical 
simulations of the actual future share prices at expiration date, which determine the option’s 
intrinsic value at that later date.  
In order to determine the change in an option’s price, it is necessary to model the change in actual 
share price over time since the option price at a given date depends “directly” on the share price on 
that date. The capital asset pricing model, CAPM, is the most natural choice for modelling these 
share price changes. CAPM is a widely accepted normative model of effect of market risk for share 
returns, and the share prices follow directly from these returns for shares without dividend 
payments, and the illustration options have such shares as underlying assets. And although Black 
and Scholes (1973) do not primarily derive their formula for the market price of European option 
from CAPM, they demonstrate that alternatively it can be derived from CAPM.  
Therefore, CAPM and the future share value probability distribution underlying the Black-Scholes 
formula are here used in combination here to simulate numerically the intrinsic values at exercise 
date of two specific European ESOs via simulations of shares prices on exercise date, scaled by the 
share price at grant date. Specifically, the exercise date share price is found by consecutive share 
price simulations by which each new share price is derived from the previous one by a drift factor 
and a lognormal random shock depending upon the share price volatility. Using these calculations 
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the risk corrected share prices, from which the grant date option price is found according to the 
Black-Scholes formula. The option’s intrinsic value price at exercise date follows quite simply from 
the simulated share price at exercise date, and this intrinsic value is identical to total ESO expense 
resulting from settlement-date accounting. 
The corresponding grant date price of the ESO, which is identical to the total ESO expense resulting 
from grant-date accounting, is determined directly from the Black-Scholes formula. This formula 
has been used also to determine the true expected value of the intrinsic value of the ESO on exercise 
date by a “trick calculation”: a false “grant date value” of the option can be found by substituting 
the risk free rate with the cost of equity in the Black-Scholes formula, and this false “grant date 
value” plus the accumulated accrued interests, including interests on interests on that “grant date 
value” until exercise date, will be identical to the expected value of the option on exercise date.  
In the presentation of the simulation results here, the specification of the effects of various β-
estimates for the company’s (long run) cost of equity has been bypassed: the simulation results for 
the probability distribution of the ESO values on the expiration date are shown for a relatively broad 
range of the size of the cost of equity, which is supposed to reflect both a broad range of relevant 
share β’s and a relatively broad range of estimates of the size of “share market return” in CAPM, 
and thus also a broad range for the size of the risk premium in that model.  
Table 2 presents the results of such numerical simulations of the probability distribution of the 
intrinsic values on expiration date for an EOS with a life of 4 years, the grant date fair value of this 
ESO and also the statistically expected exercise date value of that option; and table 3 presents quite 
similar simulation results for an ESO with a life of 10 years. Both tables show the numerical results 
for an ESO of the European type, which gives the employees the right to purchase an existing 
shares on expiration date for the price of the share on grant date, 100, and it is assumed that the 
company does not pay dividends. 
        
                          [Insert table 2 and table 3 here, please] 
 
The numerically simulated means of total ESO expenses in table 2 and 3 are close to their expected 
values. This is due to the high number of trials with the numerical simulations since the standard 
deviations for the total ESO expense are pretty high in all the cases shown. 
The simulation results in tables 2 and 3 clearly demonstrate that there are significant differences 
between the size of the total ESO expenses resulting from the grant-date accounting method and the 
long run mean size of the total ESO expenses resulting from the settlement-date accounting method 
for identical ESOs.  For the two options used for illustration, the mean total ESO expense by 
settlement-date accounting is between 1.4 and 6.1 times higher than the total ESO expense resulting 
from the grant-date method for the examples shown. The results in the tables show that “this 
enhancing expense effect” from settlement-date accounting increases with the cost of equity, 
especially so in case of low volatility of the underlying share. And the effect also increases 
significantly with the lifetime of the option. The simulation results also show that the variability of 
total ESO expenses by settlement-date accounting increases considerably with share price volatility, 
with the lifetime of the option and with the company’s cost of equity, i.e. the expected long run rate 
of return for a share in the company. 
It should be noticed, though, that the tables show “only” the absolute sizes of the total ESO 
expenses and that these expenses are the only accounting items shown. An unfortunate effect of this 
is that the figures might leave a somewhat false impression of the size and the volatility of total 
ESO expenses resulting from settlement-date accounting. At least a subjective impression of high 
highly volatile total ESO expenses resulting from this method would most likely have been 
modified if other accounting figures, for example net income, had been presented since the total 
ESO expense will tend to be closely related to total net income over the lifetime of options in cases 
where the lifetimes of the options are as high as they are for the options used for illustration here, 4 
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accumulated share price changes over the lifetime of the option, and the accumulated share price 
change for a company share is typically also close to the company’s accumulated net income over 
longer time periods. By use of settlement-date accounting the total ESO expenses will thus seem 
much more stable when related to total net incomes before ESO expenses.  
But the absolute size of ESO expenses will vary much by using settlement-date accounting. 
Kirschenheiter et al. (2004) imply that high volatility of ESO expenses resulting from settlement-
date accounting may itself cause resistance towards the method. The next section demonstrates, 
however, that the ESO expense resulting from settlement-date accounting can be hedged if there is a 
wish to do so. 
 
Hedging of shareholders’ ESO expense risk  
If the company can acquire call options on its shares which in number and terms are identical to the 
call options that it has granted to ESO holders, its shareholders´ ESO risk for variation in the 
absolute size of the their income reductions from the ESOs resulting from settlement-date 
accounting is naturally eliminated. In settlement-date accounting the risk elimination effect from 
such a hedge can be recognized in the financial statements. By use of this accounting method the 
changes in the ESO obligation are recognized with effect for income and the hedge effect of the 
company possessions of hedging call options should consequently also be recognized with effect for 
income. In grant-date accounting such recognition would be illogical and invalid because the ESO 
expense is recognized in income as if the price risk of ESOs is hedged away by company 
acquisition of hedging call options. So in that case an inclusion of an actual hedge effect of the 
company’s holdings of call options would result in “double counting” of the hedge effect for 
shareholders’ ESO expense. But since settlement-date accounting reflects the actual transfer of 
company income from shareholders to ESO holders, there is no such double-counting effect from 
income recognition of the hedge effect from call options which eliminate the share price risk from 
ESOs. 
For most companies such hedging call option effects are not relevant, however, because in practice 
they cannot acquire call options on their own shares. Much more companies can acquire treasury 
shares
3 so a much more relevant question is: can a hedge effect of company acquisitions of treasury 
shares be accounted for and, if so, how? 
This question should not be met by the knee-jerk reaction that accounting logic and concepts 
foreclose that a company can recognize a hedge effect from treasury share holdings. Recognition of 
a hedge of shareholders’ risk from their obligation to ESO holders by use of treasury share holdings 
is not precluded for conceptual reasons in the equity and income sharing model for ESO accounting. 
The reason is that this interpretation of ESO accounting can reconcile the view that treasury shares 
are not assets for the company with the fact that treasury shares (or other share price hedging 
instruments) have asset characteristics for the shareholders in relation to their residual benefit 
sharing arrangement with the option holders. A parallel is that a group internal receivable has asset 
effects for majority shareholders, and in some situations such a receivable can hedge the majority 
shareholders’ foreign currency risk although the receivable is not an asset for the group. The 
mechanism behind the hedge effects of treasury shares for shareholders’ ESO expense risk is little a 
different, though. Basically the hedge effect of treasury shares is brought about by an additional 
split of the ESO income effects between shareholders. The present shareholders will share the ESO 
enumeration effects with the previous shareholders: ex ante, the grant date fair value of the ESO is 
                                                 
3 For many years several Danish companies have systematically acquired treasury shares when they have granted ESOs. 
Most of the companies have not used accounting methods which result in recognition of financial income effects from 
the ESOs – until 2005 accounting for ESOs was not regulated in Denmark. Accordingly, company hedging behaviour 
clearly seems to stem from the intuition that there is a “real” hedge effect of the ESO price risk for shareholders 
resulting from treasury share acquisitions.  
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the shareholders who remain as shareholders in the company.  
If the financial statements shall accommodate the existing shareholders’ viewpoint, this additional 
income sharing effect must be reflected in the financial statements when the company follows a 
strategy that hedges its existing shareholders’ price risk from ESOs. 
Here will not be dealt with criteria for allowing such hedge accounting. The only aim is to illustrate 
the hedge accounting construct and to describe the financial statement effects of such a hedging 
accounting by use of simple examples. Therefore it is simply presumed that the company with the 
ESO obligation pursues a “sufficiently effective” δ-hedging strategy in relation to this obligation: at 
the beginning of each month the company δ-rebalances its holdings of treasury shares with the 
effect that the changes in the market value of these share holdings practically will outweigh changes 
in the fair price of the its ESO-obligation
4.  
The hedge accounting method needed to account for the hedge effect of treasury shares for 
shareholders’ share price risk from ESOs is somewhat special. One reason is that treasury shares are 
not assets for the company even though they are assets for existing shareholders vis-à-vis ESO 
holders. This does not result in a serious problem, however, because the holdings of treasury shares 
influence only the dichotomization of total company income and total equity in existing 
shareholders’ part and option holders’ part. And as noted, this determination of the dichotomization 
effect is made by a calculation “outside” the financial statements, just as the calculation of the 
dichotomization of a consolidated group’s total equity and income into the majority’s and the 
minority’s part is made “outside” the consolidated statements. In such a calculation outside the 
financial statements, it is not a problem to include assets and liabilities which are not assets and 
liabilities for the accounting entity, i.e. the company, but “only” assets and liabilities for one of the 
partner groups involved in the sharing of total company equity and income.  
Another part of the hedge effect of treasury shares for the ESO risk entails a trickier accounting 
problem. If treasury shares are to be “recognized” as assets for shareholders by the calculation of 
the effects of existing shareholders’ equity and income sharing with option holders, this recognition 
must be done in such a way that an erroneous extrapolation of existing shareholders’ equity is 
avoided. A simple, outright inclusion of treasury shares as assets for the existing shareholders 
would, quite absurdly, imply an extrapolation of existing shareholders’ equity with the effect that 
“existing shareholders’ equity” would include non-existing shareholders’ equity. And a similar 
extrapolation of existing shareholders´ income would result if gains and losses from treasury share 
holdings were simply included in income for existing shareholders by the calculation of the equity 
and income split between shareholders and ESO holders. 
The reasoning underlying option price theory indicates, however, how such erroneous extrapolation 
effects can be avoided by an inclusion of treasury shares in the calculation of the equity and income 
separation effects from ESOs for shareholders. The basic idea behind option price theory is that the 
value of a portfolio consisting of 1) an option obligation, 2) appropriate holdings (“δ−holdings”) of 
the shares underlying this option obligation and 3) a debt resulting from the residual financing of 
these share holdings will be invariant to a random share price change. According to option price 
theory such a portfolio will be risk protected during the entire lifetime of the option if the size of the 
hedging share holdings is continuously δ−adjusted. If this is the case, the existence of such a 
portfolio over the lifetime of the option will have the effect that all random changes in option value, 
resulting from random share price changes, will be substituted by a certain interest expense effect. 
Figuratively, this substitution takes place in two interrelated steps: 1) the uncertain option 
obligation value changes are outweighed by uncertain value changes of hedging share holdings and 
2) the uncertain value changes in share holdings during a period of time are outweighed by a risk 
                                                 
4 Ideally, the rebalancing of hedging treasury share holdings should be made “continuously” to eliminate the price risk 
completely, but the hedge strategy is robust, so monthly rebalancing will in practice eliminate most of the risk.    
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option obligation.  
With appropriate adaptations this substitution mechanism can be incorporated in the hedge 
accounting method used for the calculation of the equity and income split effect of ESOs for 
existing shareholders in cases when the company hedges its shareholders’ risk from the option 
obligation.      
The basic elements in this hedge accounting method are shown for the option with a lifetime of 4 
years, which was used for illustration above. In order to keep the focus on the accounting problems, 
it is assumed throughout that the option obligation to ESO holders is so marginal in relation to the 
size of the market value of company shares that the share price effect resulting from the hedge itself 
is also so marginal that it can be ignored
5. 
Assume that a company in which the share has a price volatility at 10% and an expected rate of 
return at 10% p.a. has granted ESOs which give the employees the right to acquire after 4 years 
some of  its shares for a price of 100, the grant date price for these shares. If the risk free interest 
rate is 3% p.a., the Black-Scholes grant date fair value of these options will be 14.48, cf. table 2, 
and the expected value of the resulting uncertain enumeration expenses will be 49.39, cf. also table 
2. 
Assume that this company hedges its existing shareholders’ price risk from the ESO obligation by 
δ−holdings of treasury shares, and also that the company recognizes the effect of this hedge in its 
financial statement. A problem is then to determine the size of δ. δ depends upon share price 
volatility, but also depends upon the interest rate “sacrifice” caused by the hedge. In the market, this 
interest rate sacrifice will be the risk free market rate because payments from the hedge portfolio are 
virtually certain if hedging share holdings are continuously δ−adjusted (and any minor deviations in 
payments will be uncorrelated with market risk), and because the market price will be set by the 
most efficient option obligation hedgers (/option obligation acquirers) and that will be those who 
will incur only a interest expense determined by the risk free market rate when they borrow in order 
to carry out risk free arbitrage. The interest rate sacrifice borne by the company holding caused by 
holding of treasury shares will most often be higher, though.  Although some companies can be in 
the situation that their interest rate sacrifice will be determined by the risk free market rate when 
they shall finance a risk eliminating arbitrage with treasury share holdings, most companies will be 
in the situation that this interest rate sacrifice will be determined by their marginal borrowing rate. 
In the following is assumed that this is the case and that the marginal borrowing rate is 4% p.a. in 
all cases. Therefore, the hedging δ´s are determined by this interest rate, not the risk free market 
rate. This implies that the hedging δ on grant date will be 0.8159 for this company’s specific ESO 
obligation; so the company will acquire treasury shares for the market value of 81.59 (= δ*share 
price)
6 and subsequently it δ−adjusts its treasury share holdings monthly during the lifetime of the 
option. Likewise, the grant date value of the option is determined by this marginal borrowing rate 
instead of the risk free market rate – this grant date value will not affect the total ESO enumeration 
expense, though, but it can affect the allocation of the hedged total enumeration expense over the 
lifetime of the ESO.  
                                                 
5 The company’s hedge strategy will influence both its share price and the fair value of its option obligation if the option 
obligation is big relative to the total market value of all residual rights in the company because the hedging strategy has 
market effects. One effect is that the company’s acquisitions of hedging shares basically have a dividend effect for the 
fair value of the option. In cases when this dividend effect of the hedge is low in relation to the total value of company 
shares, the fair value reducing effect for the option value from this violation of the “no dividend” assumption can be 
ignored, however. Another effect is that the hedge strategy will increase share price volatility, and this effect will 
increase the options’ fair value and it can also influence share prices. These effects can also be ignored, however, when 
the option obligation is low in relation to total shareholder value.      
6 It is assumed throughout that divisional problems by company acquisitions and reissues of treasury shares can be 
ignored. 
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treasury shares for both the company and for the separation calculation are illustrated in a single 
table, as shown in table 4. 
 
[Insert table 4 here, please]  
 
As reflected by the first entry in table 4 an ESO obligation for shareholders is recognized at grant 
date, but it is balanced by an asset, “prepaid expenses”, of exactly the same size as the option 
obligation at that date, i.e. the option’s grant date fair value. This is done as a means to obtain 
informative allocation of the total enumeration expenses resulting for shareholders from the ESO 
over the lifetime of the ESO. 
As illustrated in the next row in table 4, the company’s acquisition of hedging treasury shares 
results in a reduction of owners’ equity. In relation to the existing shareholders’ income sharing 
with the ESO holders, the treasury shares are, however, recognized as an asset for the remaining 
shareholders, but in such a way that the net asset effect for these shareholders is zero. This is 
accomplished by recognition of an imputed liability for shareholders, which is identical to the 
acquisition price for the treasury shares; logically a company purchase of its own shares has a nil 
net effect for existing shareholders’ equity (the reduction in company equity is a reduction in its 
previous shareholders’ part of equity). Subsequent company acquisitions (and reissues) of company 
shares which are made in order to rebalance the company’s holdings of treasury shares to the 
changes in the option obligation’s δ is treated in exactly the same way (for a reissue: in exactly the 
opposite way). 
Over time, shareholders’ imputed liability grows with an imputed accrued interest expense which is 
found from use of the marginal borrowing rate; share price changes are added to (/subtracted from) 
treasury share holdings; and the option obligation’s fair value changes are also recognized. All of 
these changes in existing shareholders’ assets and liabilities are charged to the shareholders’ part of 
company income.  
The intuition behind this hedge accounting construct is that if the share price increases unusually 
much over the option period, the existing shareholders will sacrifice more to option holders than 
expected. But they will be compensated for this unusually high sacrifice due to their sharing with 
previous shareholders, which is brought about by the hedging strategy with treasury shares: their 
share price gains on treasury share holdings will also be unusually high. And the income effect for 
the existing shareholders is exactly the opposite in relation to ESO holders and in relation to the 
previous shareholders when the share price decreases over the lifetime of the ESO or it increases 
less than expected. The combined effect is that the “unexpected” income effects caused by 
“unexpected” sizes of share prices changes “net out” almost completely for the existing 
shareholders over the option peiod.  
Exactly how the value changes in the existing shareholders’ “specific assets and liabilities” are 
charged as net effects for existing shareholders’ part of total equity and income is an allocation 
problem and the proper choice of a specific allocation method is an accounting judgement. The 
choice of allocation method does naturally not, however, affect the size of the total enumeration 
expense in focus here. Here the following allocation method is used for illustrations of the hedge 
accounting construct for the 4 years ESO case: in each of the years 1-3 is expensed ¼ of the total 
expected ESO expense, found by option price theory and in year 4 is expensed the rest of total 
actual ESO expense, which follows from the hedge accounting for the specific case.  
Tables 5 and 6 illustrate the financial income effects for this ESO case for two different share price 
events. In both tables the share prices have been numerically simulated at the end of each month 
and the company’s holdings of treasury shares have been δ-adjusted monthly. The illustrations are 
based on the assumption that the ESOs give the employees the right to acquire shares which were 
issued before grant date. 
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Table 5 illustrates a situation when the company’ s share price increases by random changes from 
100 on grant date to 182.50 on exercise date, which is a pretty high share price. If the company had 
not hedged the existing shareholders’ ESO-risk, the shareholders would have ended up with a total 
ESO expense of 82.50. The financial statement illustration shows that by the hedging with treasury 
share holdings, the existing shareholders total ESO expense will end up being 20.19. 
Table 6 illustrates a situation when the company’ s share price decreases by random changes from 
100 on grant date to 85.68 on exercise date, which is an extremely low share price. If the company 
had not hedged the shareholders’ ESO-risk, the shareholders would have ended up without an ESO 
expense. The financial statement illustration shows that by the hedging with treasury share 
holdings, the existing shareholders sacrifice will end up with 20.31 as the total ESO expense. 
According to option price theory the expected value of the total hedged ESO expense for existing 
shareholders will be 19.95 for this option granted– the grant date value of option found by use of 
the marginal borrowing rate, 17.00, plus the imputed accrued interest over the lifetime of the option, 
also determined by use of that interest rate. Tables 5 and 6 show that by both a share price increase 
and a share price decrease over the option period the existing shareholders will end up with 
sacrifices resulting from hedged ESOs which are close to this expected total expense in both 
situations. 
Even though these illustrations cannot reflect precisely the effects of all the individual hedge 
transactions, they show of the hedge accounting construct and of the hedge mechanism. 
The next section shows the results of numerical simulations which have been made in order to 
illustrate more generally the hedged income effects for existing shareholders. 
 
Simulated shareholder income effects from ESOs by company hedging with treasury shares 
Methodologically, an analysis of the effects of this hedge accounting method by use of numerical 
simulations has the advantage that the simulation results will describe the accounting effects for a 
large number of random outcomes for share price changes in a long run perspective since the results 
are derived from a “long run” probability distribution of share price returns. 
The simulation results presented here are the total enumeration expenses for existing shareholders 
resulting from a grant of an ESO combined with the described δ-hedge strategy with treasury shares 
over the entire lifetime of an ESO by use of the hedge accounting method described. Simulation 
results are presented for the two options which were used for illustration of unhedged total 
enumeration expenses in tables 2 and 3 and for the same option volatilities as in these two tables. 
The simulated total enumeration expenses by hedge accounting, which are presented in table 7 (8), 
correspond thus completely with the results in table 2 (3) for the numerical simulations of the 
enumeration expenses without hedging in the sense that the tables, pairwise, illustrate the two 
different enumeration expense effects for identical ESOs and for same set of simulated share prices 
for each of the situations in which the parameter values are identical.    
 
[Insert tables 7 and 8 here, please]  
 
Tables 7 and 8 demonstrate that the hedge accounting method results in simulated average total 
enumeration expenses which in all cases are close to the expected enumeration expenses which are 
found directly from use of the Black-Scholes formula, using the marginal borrowing rate in the 
calculation. This demonstrates that the hedge accounting method is unbiased. The simulation results 
show also that the enumeration expenses, which results from use of the hedge accounting method, 
do not differ much from the expected enumeration expenses even though the portfolio δ−revisions 
are made only monthly, not continuously. This means that the hedging strategy will eliminate 
almost completely the volatility of the total ESO expenses for the existing shareholders even if 
hedge strategy is not implemented “perfectly”. 
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and the corresponding results for total hedged ESO expenses for otherwise identical situations show 
that hedging of ESO obligations will have a special effect. The hedging will not only almost 
eliminate the variability of total ESO expenses, the hedged ESO expenses will also, on average, be 
considerably lower than the total unhedged ESO expenses. In otherwise completely identical cases, 
i.e. for identical ESOs and the identical sets of share price changes, the averages of total hedged 
ESO expenses illustrated in tables 7 and 8 are seen to be considerably lower than the averages of 
total unhedged ESO expenses illustrated in tables 2 and 3. The reason is that the unhedged total 
ESO expense and the hedged total ESO expense are fundamentally different types of expenses and 
the difference in the character of the expense is accompanied be a difference in the numerical level 
of the total expenses. The total unhedged ESO expense reflects the actual the share price discount 
given to ESO holders at exercise date – all the shareholders share the risk for the size of this 
discount and on even terms. In contrast, the hedged total ESO expense reflects the certainty 
equivalent value of these potential discounts given to option holders by remaining shareholders, and 
this certainty equivalent value is low compared with the expected value, on grant date, of the actual 
discounts given to options holders. This is especially so in companies with a high cost of equity; cf. 
that tables 2 and 3 show that the averages of total unhedged ESO expenses increases considerably 
with the company’s cost of equity while tables 7 and 8 show that the average of total hedged ESO 
expenses are practically invariant to the company’s cost of equity in otherwise identical situation. 
This reflects one of the implications of option price theory: the market risk of the share underlying a 
call option does not affect the market price of this option.  
The difference in character and size of unhedged and hedged ESO expenses implies that 
“shareholders’ part of income” will differ correspondingly in character and size with the type of the 
ESO expenses deducted to determine the shareholders’ part of income. If the ESO expense 
deducted to determine the shareholders part of income is a hedged ESO expense, the shareholders’ 
part of company income will be higher, on average, than when an unhedged ESO expense is 
deducted. The downside of the hedge effect is that the existing shareholders’ part of income will 
have a higher market risk; the hedge has the effect that the existing shareholders will bear all the 
market risk for income. This means that the shareholders’ part of income must also, figuratively, be 
more “harshly discounted” for valuation purposes when “existing shareholders income” results 
from a deduction of hedged ESO expenses compared than when “shareholders income” results from 
deduction of unhedged ESO expenses. On average, existing shareholders will not make a gain from 
the company’s hedging of its ESO obligations and ESO expenses, because their sharing 
arrangements with previous shareholders is a fair game in well functioning share market; but 
existing shareholders’ part of company income will certainly on average be higher if the company 
make such a hedge due to the “harsh discounting effect” for ESO expense which follows from the 
hedge of an equity option obligation. This “shift of level effect” for shareholders’ part of company 
income from hedging of ESO expenses will also result if the company hedges its ESO obligation by 
acquiring a matching call option on its shares – the effect is a result of the hedge, not of the specific 
hedging method used. And it will result from hedging of all equity share options.  
It will naturally be the financial analysts’ job to solve this particular valuation problem if companies 
hedge their ESO obligations and recognize the hedge effect. But it will be accountants’ job to 
inform very clearly in the financial statements whether the ESO expenses are hedged or not.  
 
Concluding remarks 
The main conclusion is that a shareholder focused residually rewarded partners’ equity view makes 
remeasurements of equity with effect for income conceptually valid in the sense that a 
remeasurement of non-shareholders’ part of equity with effect for shareholders’ part of equity and 
income is a logical consequence of this equity view. This conclusion has pretty far-reaching 
implications. It does not only support the conceptual validity of settlement-date accounting for 
ESOs, it also calls for direct measurements of other non-shareholder equity elements, for example 
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border line between liabilities and equity should thus not automatically be seen also as the border 
line between directly measured elements of company capital, i.e. “liability elements”, and non-
measured elements of company capital, “equity elements”. This follows from the fact that even 
though total equity, by logic, cannot be directly measured, since it is the algebraic net result of 
measurements of assets and liabilities, it makes perfect sense to measure directly special parts of 
total equity with effect for the residual part of total equity, the shareholders’ part, and thus 
consequently also with effect for the shareholders’ part of income. 
The numerical simulation analyses demonstrate that in a long run perspective the grant-date 
accounting method for ESOs will tend to result in enumeration expenses which are considerably 
lower than the clean income reduction effects for shareholders, i.e. the enumeration expenses 
resulting from settlement-date accounting, if the ESO obligation is not hedged by the company. The 
analyses also show that the company’s cost of equity, share price volatility and option lifetime are 
important determinants of the size of the dirty income effects, which in the long run perspective are 
to be expected from of grant-date accounting, and also that these factors influence the variability of 
these dirty income effects.  
An implication of the shareholder focused residually rewarded partners’ equity view is that treasure 
shares have asset characteristics for existing shareholders. Systematic rebalancing of treasury share 
holdings can hedge existing shareholders’ share price risks from ESO obligation because such 
holdings will split all the shareholders’ sacrifice from a grant of an ESO into two parts, the previous 
shareholders’ part and the existing shareholders’ part, in such a way that the existing shareholders’ 
sacrifice ex post will deviate very little from the size of the sacrifice expected at grant date. The 
hedge accounting construct will reflect this hedge effect in an unbiased manner in the financial 
statements. Hedging of an ESO obligation will not only affect the variability of the ESO expense 
but also the expected level of the ESO expense, and thus also the variability and level of the 
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Tables 
       
Table 1. Settlement-date accounting for ESOs. 
Liability presentation, equity separation presentation and hybrid presentation 
Equity separation presentation 
of ESO-effects 
(“Consolidation” layout) 
Liability presentation of ESO-
effects 
IFRS 2’s hybrid presentation 
of ESO-effects 
(“IFRS 2 layout”) 
 
Previous year  This year   Previous year  This year  Previous year  This year 
Balance Sheet (extract)        
Liabilities and O/E:         
Liabilities:         
Option obligation  n/a  n/a 100 300 n/a  n/a
Owners’/ partners’ equity        
Shareholders and option 
holders (unseparated)  n/a  n/a n/a n/a 10,200 11,750 
Shareholders  10,100 11,450 10,100 11,450  n/a  n/a
Option holders  100  300  n/a n/a n/a  n/a
O/E total  10,200 11,750 10,100 11,450 10,200 11,750 
Total Liabilities and O/E   10,200 11,750 10,200 11,750 10,200 11,750 
        
Income Statement (extract)        
Net Income (pre option 
expense effects)   1,550   1,550   1,550 
ESO expense (options)    n/a  50 200 50 200
Net income for residually 
rewarded company partners  -  1,550  -  n/a - n/a
Net income for option holders   50 200 - n/a - n/a
Net income for shareholders  -  1,350 -  1,350 -  1,350
 
  
   
Table 2. Simulation results for ESO expenses by settlement-date accounting resulting from an ESO of the European type with a lifetime of 
 4 years (share price at grant = exercise price=100) for various parameter values. In all cases the risk free interest rate is set at 3% p.a.
*
Volatility of share price, 
annually 10%      10% 10% 20% 20% 20% 30% 30% 30% 40% 40% 40%
Cost of equity, annually.  6%  8% 10% 6% 8% 10%  6% 8% 10% 6% 8% 10% 
ESO expenses, grant-date 
accounting 14.48    14.48 14.48 21.27 21.27 21.27  28.33 28.33 28.33 35.29 35.29 35.29
Expected value of ESO 
expenses, settlement-date 
accounting 28.39    38.26 49.39 34.65 43.29 53.20  42.38 50.62 59.98 50.35 58.54 67.74
Ratio: Expected expenses 
settlement-d.acc./expenses 
grant-date acc.  2.0  2.6 3.4 1.6 2.0 2.5  1.5 1.8 2.1 1.4 1.7 1.9 
  Simulation results (10,000 trials for each set) 
P e r c e n t i l e :     0 % 000 00000   0000    
Percentile: 10%  0  4,47 13,10000  000000  
Percentile: 20%  5,29  14,38 23,47000  000000  
Percentile: 30%  12,23  21,68 31,61 0 3,04 10,69  000000  
Percentile: 40%  18,30  28,08 38,88 5,61 14,83 23,35  0 0 6,66000  
Percentile: 50%  24,70  34,94 46,47 16,86 27,35 37,10  6,23 14,77 24,42 0 0,17 6,56 
Percentile: 60%  31,03  41,67 53,86 29,17 40,66 52,25  24,02 32,36 44,30 13,45 22,33 30,40 
Percentile: 70%  38,51  49,45 62,56 43,40 56,43 69,66  46,02 56,01 68,52 41,81 51,76 62,70 
Percentile: 80%  47,44  59,26 73,17 62,73 76,99 92,19  75,24 87,53 103,31 82,41 96,46 110,58 
Percentile: 90%  60,88  73,10 89,08 93,46 109,53 129,65  128,94 141,24 162,10 159,24 176,54 198,74 
Percentile: 100%  163,17  164,93 224,56 362,12 537,91 531,12  972,94 1085,35 1030,30 1485,59 1588,87 1982,35 
       
Mean        28,34 37,83 49,50 33,93 42,78 52,86 42,66 48,67 57,98 51,30 57,60 66,87
Median        24,70 34,94 46,47 16,86 27,35 37,10 6,23 14,77 24,42 0,00 0,17 6,56
Standard deviation  23,77  26,25 29,87 45,10 50,83 57,97  73,47 76,91 86,39 107,09 111,84 129,08 
* The continuous interest rate convention is used throughout. An interest rate at 10% p.a. by this convention is identical to a 10.517% interest rate by the 
discrete interest convention, and an interest rate at 3% p.a. (continuous convention) is identical to a rate at 3.045% p.a. (discrete convention). 
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Table 3. Simulation results for ESO expenses by settlement-date accounting resulting from an ESO of the European type with a lifetime of 10 
years (share price at grant = exercise price=100) and no dividends for various parameter values. In all cases the risk free interest rate is set at 3% 
p.a. 
Volatility of share price. 
Annually 10%    10% 10% 20% 20% 20% 30% 30% 30% 40% 40% 40%
Cost of equity, annually.  6%  8% 10% 6% 8% 10% 6% 8% 10% 6% 8% 10% 
ESO expenses, grant-date 
accounting  28.42    28.42 28.42 36.86 36.86 36.86 46.17 46.17 46.17 55.13 55.13 55.13
Expected ESO expenses, 
settlement-date accounting  82.83  122.90 172.26 89.92 127.25 174.64 101.56 137.46 183.05 114.11 149.78 194.75 
Ratio: Expected expenses 
settlement-d.acc./expenses 
grant-date acc.  2.9    4.3 6.1 2.4 3.5 4.7 2.2 3.0 4.0 2.1 2.7 3.5
  Simulation results (10,000 trials for each set) 
Percentile: 0%  0,00  0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Percentile: 10%  15,91  39,43 73,10 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Percentile: 20%  32,71  60,29 97,60 0,00 8,00 32,04 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Percentile: 30%  46,30  78,70 118,38 5,94 31,71 59,99 0,00 0,00 5,54 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Percentile: 40%  59,80  94,95 138,13 25,64 57,74 90,09 0,00 10,85 35,59 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Percentile: 50%  72,51  111,44 158,24 47,01 83,37 121,61 17,48 41,57 74,97 0,00 0,90 23,48 
Percentile: 60%  86,24  129,45 178,66 72,76 115,07 160,22 50,08 82,72 123,13 12,51 38,47 71,09 
Percentile: 70%  103,33  151,31 203,09 105,00 154,53 210,44 94,17 137,15 188,43 57,19 90,53 140,78 
Percentile: 80%  124,45  178,37 234,99 151,68 210,32 277,13 160,52 223,41 288,53 133,15 184,53 261,92 
Percentile: 90%  158,06  221,81 285,18 232,78 308,09 401,41 287,48 387,57 480,58 305,16 404,24 537,43 
Percentile: 100%  426,54  680,83 932,89 1679,90 1741,49 3069,20 5585,17 5234,05 10009,56 6495,90 15572,87 18268,07 
    
Mean    81,89  170,76 122,79 87,86 127,84 175,77 102,26 141,33 185,04 112,78 144,59 203,50
Median    72,51  158,24 111,44 47,01 83,37 121,61 17,48 41,57 74,97 0 0,9 23,48
Standard deviation  57,64  73,40 87,46 119,31 150,62 194,02 210,52 268,33 343,43 329,34 407,01 570,45 
  
Table 4. Illustration of basic entries made for an ESO-grant and for company acquisitions of 
hedging treasury shares. 
 
Entries for the separation calculation 
(not included in the financial statements)   
 


















Grant of option    +17.00 +17.00   
Acquisition of shares  -81.59  +81.59 +81.59   -81.59 
Balance sheet   -81.59  +17.00 +81.59 +81.59 +17.00  -81.59  
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Table 5. Illustration of hedge accounting effects of treasury shares for the ESO with a lifetime of 4 years. 
Case with a share price increase. Share price at exercise: 182.50 
 
 
  Entries for income sharing calculation 
(not included in the financial statements) 
  
Year 1 















ESO granted    +17.00      +17.00      
Acquisitions of treasury shares (net)  -96.13    +96.13 +96.13   -96.13   
Treasury share holding gains (net)    -16.02 +16.02         
Option value changes (net)    +13.23      +13.23      
Shareholders’ imputed interest 
expense    +3.67    +3.67       
ESO expense for shareholders  
1)    -4.99             -4.99
Ending balance year 1    -96.13  12.89 112.16 99.81 30.23  -96.13 -4.99
Year 2         
Acquisitions of treasury shares (net)  -6.71     +6.71 +6.71    -6.71   
Treasury share holding gains (net)    -29.96 +29.96         
Option value changes (net)    +26.42      +26.42      
Shareholders’ imputed interest 
expense    +4.30    +4.30       
ESO expense for shareholders  
1)    -4.99             -4.99
Ending balance year 2  -102.84  8.66 148.82 110.81 56.65  -102.84 -9.97
Year 3         
Acquisitions of treasury shares (net)  -0.14     +0.14 +0.14    -0.14   
Treasury share holding gains (net)     -25.20 +25.20            
Option value changes (net)    +21.44      +21.44      
Shareholders’ imputed interest 
expense    +4.53    +4.53       
ESO expense for shareholders  
1)    -4.99             -4.99
Ending balance year 3   -102.98  4.44 174.16 115.48 78.08  -102.98 -14.96
Year 4           
Acquisitions of treasury shares (net)  0.00     0.00 0.00    0.00
Treasury share holding gains (net)    -8.33 8.33      
Option value changes (net)    +4.41      +4.41      
Shareholders’ imputed interest 
expense   +4.71     +4.71    
ESO expense for shareholders 
2)  -5.23           -5.23
Preliminary ending balance  -102.98  0.00 182.50 120.19 82.50  -102.98 -20.19
Option exercise  100.00     -182.50 -100.00 -82.50  100.00   
Ending balance  year 4 (after exercise) -2.98 0.00 0.00 20.19 0.00  -2.98 -20.19
1) ¼ of total expected ESO expense, 19.95 (grant date value, 17.00, multiplied by e
4*0.04). 
2) Found residually = - net balance for 
prepaid expenses. 
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Case with a share price decrease. Share price at exercise: 85.68. 
 
  Entries for the separation calculation 
(not included in the financial statements) 
  
Year 1 

















ESO granted    +17.00      +17.00      
Acquisitions of treasury shares (net)  -58.32    +58.32 +58.32   -58.32   
Treasury share holding losses (net)    +10.04 -10.04         
Option value changes (net)    -12.49      -12.49      
Shareholders’ imputed interest expense    +3.02    ++3.02       
ESO expense for shareholders  
1)    -4.99             -4.99
Ending balance year 1    -58.32  12.57 48.28 61.34 4.50  -58.32 -4.99
Year 2         
Acquisitions of treasury shares (net)  +33.33     -33.33 -33.33    +33.33   
Treasury share holding losses (net)    +3.76 -3.76         
Option value changes (net)    -4.09      -4.09      
Shareholders’ imputed interest expense    +1.66    +1.66       
ESO expense for shareholders  
1)    -4.99             -4.99
Ending balance year 2  -24.98  8.92 11.19 29.66 0.41  -24.98 -9.97
Year 3         
Acquisitions of treasury shares (net)  +4.66     -4.66 -4.66    +4.66   
Treasury share holding gains (net)    -0.12 +0.12         
Option value changes (net)    -0.31      -0.31      
Shareholders’ imputed interest expense    +1.03    +1.03       
ESO expense for shareholders  
1)    -4.99             -4.99
Ending balance year 3  -20.32  4.52 6.65 26.03 0.10  -20.32 -14.96
Year 4         
Acquisitions of treasury shares (net)  +6.60     -6.60 -6.60    +6.60   
Treasury share holding losses (net)    +0.04 -0.04         
Option value changes (net)    -0.10      -0.10      
Shareholders’ imputed interest expense    +0.88    +0.88       
ESO expense for shareholders 
2)  -5.35           -5.35
Option termination         
Ending balance year 4  -13.72  0.00 0.00 20.31 0.00  -13.72 -20.31
1) ¼ of the total expected ESO expense, 19.95 . 




Table 7. Simulation results for enumeration expenses by settlement-date accounting resulting from an ESO of the European 
type with a lifetime of 4 years (share price at grant = exercise price = 100) and no dividends for various relevant parameters. 
Results for hedging with treasury shares. 
Volatility, annually  10%  10% 10% 20% 20% 20% 30%  30% 30% 40% 40% 40%
Cost of equity, annually  6%  8% 10% 6% 8% 10% 6%  8% 10% 6% 8% 10%
Grant date value (mar-
ginal borrowing rate)  17.00  17.00 17.00 23.21 23.21 23.21 29.98  29.98 29.98 36.72 36.72 36.72
Expected total expense at 
expiration date  19.95  19.95 19.95 27.24 27.24 27.24 35.18  35.18 35.18 43.09 43.09 43.09
  Simulations of total enumeration expenses (10,000 trials for each set) 
Percentile: 0%  16.61  16.47 16.81 18.89 19.15 18.72 21.18  21.46 19.81 24.82 25.75 23.41
Percentile: 10%  19.12  19.28 19.45 24.96 25.04 25.17 31.56  31.45 31.68 38.30 38.26 38.30
Percentile: 20%  19.48  19.57 19.66 25.82 25.89 26.01 32.94  32.84 32.99 40.06 40.02 40.13
Percentile: 30%  19.67  19.73 19.80 26.40 26.45 26.49 33.77  33.72 33.87 41.24 41.18 41.30
Percentile: 40%  19.82  19.86 19.90 26.84 26.85 26.93 34.48  34.45 34.54 42.11 42.06 42.18
Percentile: 50%  19.94  19.97 19.99 27.21 27.22 27.30 35.13  35.08 35.17 42.97 42.88 42.97
Percentile: 60%  20.07  20.07 20.09 27.60 27.63 27.65 35.74  35.72 35.79 43.79 43.68 43.77
Percentile: 70%  20.21  20.20 20.20 28.06 28.05 28.04 36.43  36.37 36.48 44.68 44.62 44.72
Percentile: 80%  20.40  20.36 20.34 28.60 28.56 28.53 37.31  37.20 37.37 45.87 45.76 45.88
Percentile: 90%  20.78  20.66 20.58 29.51 29.35 29.38 38.71  38.59 38.69 47.68 47.55 47.71
Percentile: 100%  25.67  26.49 25.90 37.83 38.69 37.34 62.58  56.40 55.60 75.51 73.26 67.86
    
Mean      19.95 19.97 20.01 27.24 27.25 27.29 35.13 35.06 35.20 43.00 42.92 43.03
Median      19.94 19.97 19.99 27.21 27.22 27.30 35.13 35.08 35.17 42.97 42.88 42.97
Standard deviation  0.77  0.65 0.54 1.94 1.85 1.82 3.00  2.99 2.96 3.97 3.92 3.97
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Table 8. Simulation results for enumeration expenses by settlement-date accounting resulting from an ESO of the European 
type with a lifetime of 10 years (share price at grant = exercise price = 100) and no dividends for various relevant parameters.  
Results for hedging with treasury shares.  
    Volatility,  annually 10% 10% 10% 20% 20% 20% 30% 30% 30% 40% 40% 40%
Cost of equity, annually  6%  8%  10% 6% 8% 10% 6% 8% 10% 6% 8% 10%
Grant date value (mar-
ginal borrowing rate)  34.27  34.27  34.27 41.06 41.06 41.06 49.40 49.40 49.40 57.68 57.68 57.68
Expected total expense 
at expiration date  51.12  51.12  51.12 61.25 61.25 61.25 73.70 73.70 73.70 86.05 86.05 86.05
  Simulation of total enumeration expenses (10,000 trials for each set) 
Percentile:  0%      46.83 47.81 47.76 52.56 52.68 51.47 60.77 58.72 58.55 66.61 67.32 68.87
Percentile:  10%      50.61 50.74 50.82 59.03 59.23 59.48 70.05 70.20 70.26 81.12 81.06 81.16
Percentile:  20%      50.81 50.88 50.92 59.87 60.06 60.17 71.40 71.49 71.59 82.99 82.89 82.94
Percentile:  30%      50.91 50.95 50.98 60.38 60.53 60.61 72.28 72.33 72.41 84.08 84.03 84.13
Percentile:  40%      50.99 51.02 51.03 60.81 60.91 60.95 72.95 73.00 73.07 85.01 84.98 85.06
Percentile:  50%      51.05 51.07 51.07 61.16 61.21 61.24 73.58 73.64 73.71 85.83 85.82 85.90
Percentile:  60%      51.12 51.12 51.12 61.52 61.54 61.52 74.17 74.26 74.31 86.65 86.59 86.72
Percentile:  70%      51.20 51.18 51.17 61.93 61.91 61.86 74.82 74.97 74.96 87.57 87.52 87.70
Percentile:  80%      51.31 51.26 51.24 62.46 62.41 62.27 75.71 75.84 75.75 88.70 88.74 88.83
Percentile:  90%      51.52 51.41 51.35 63.36 63.22 63.01 77.09 77.26 77.07 90.53 90.52 90.74
Percentile:  100%      57.37 54.49 54.43 72.36 69.87 72.87 93.39 90.80 89.37 116.67 106.82 109.67
    
Mean      51.07 51.08 51.08 61.18 61.24 61.24 73.58 73.68 73.69 85.84 85.82 85.95
Median      51.05 51.07 51.07 61.16 61.21 61.24 73.58 73.64 73.71 85.83 85.82 85.90
Standard  deviation      0.50 0.36 0.25 1.87 1.73 1.59 2.97 3.02 2.91 3.94 4.00 4.09
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